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NOTES

U.S. VS. INTERNATIONAL STOCK
OPTION DISCLOSURE REFORM: THE
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY LEADS
WHERE THE U.S. COMMUNITY FAILED
“The point, ladies and gentlemen,
is that greed, for lack of a better word, is good.”1
Gordon Gekko2
I. INTRODUCTION

D

isclosure requirements for compensatory stock options
were established in the United States (“U.S.”) in 1973.3
At that time, companies granted stock options almost exclusively to their corporate executives, and did so sparingly.4 However, since that time, corporations have expanded their use of
compensatory stock options, which they now use as an employment compensation mechanism for many, if not all firm em1. WALL STREET (20th Century Fox 1987).
2. Nefarious entrepreneur played by Michael Douglas in the movie WALL
STREET. Id. Film critic, Roger Ebert, described director Oliver Stone’s film as,
“a radical critique of the capitalist trading mentality,” and noted that Stone
depicts small investors as dupes. Roger Ebert, Wall Street, CHI. SUN-TIMES,
Dec. 11, 1987, 33, available at http://www.suntimes.com/ebert/ebert_reviews/
1987/12/268135.html.
3. The Accounting Principles Board (“APB”) was established by the
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants in 1959 as a successor to
the Committee on Accounting Procedure, established in 1939, and as a precursor to the Federal Accounting Standards Bureau (“FASB”), established in
1973. Financial Accounting Standards, QuickMBA, at http://www.quickmba.
com/accounting/fin/standards/ (last visited Sept. 23, 2003) [hereinafter Financial Accounting Standards]. The APB issued thirty-one opinions and four
statements, which formed the basis of the FASB’s Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (“GAAP”), the accounting standard followed in the U.S.
Id.
4. Robert Dean Ellis, Equity Derivatives, Executive Compensation, and
Agency Costs, 35 HOUS. L. REV. 399, at 412–13 (1998).
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ployees, and which account for an increasing percentage of each
employee’s annual compensation package.5 This Note argues
that U.S. accounting rules do not capture accurately corporate
operating expenses on financial statements, thus, have failed to
evolve accordingly.
The U.S. accounting standard-setting body, the Federal Accounting Standards Board (“FASB”), understood that its accounting standard created a loophole which, almost without
exception, every U.S. company used.6 Although a company was
required to charge employment compensation as an expense on
its balance sheet, reducing the amount of profit it reflected, a
company could issue stock options as part of its employment
compensation without recognizing a compensation expense on
its financial statement.7 The FASB studied this disclosure
loophole and drafted a revised procedure8 that, as this Note posits in Part III.B., would have closed the option disclosure loophole. However, Congress, in order to cater to big business interests, effectively overruled the FASB, and disclosure requirements remained largely unchanged.9
Since that time, an international group of accounting regulation agencies, which include the FASB, known as the International Accounting Standards Board (“IASB”), studied this disclosure issue.10 The IASB recognized the need for new disclosure regulations and prepared its own preliminary standard,11
which it made available to the public for comment through
March 7, 2003.12 The IASB claims that its proposed standard
5. Id.
6. Robert W. Rouse & Douglas N. Barton, Stock Compensation Accounting, J. OF ACCOUNTANCY 67, 68 (June 1993).
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. See Legislation Introduced to Overturn FASB Stock Option Proposal, J.
OF ACCOUNTANCY 15, 16 (Oct. 1993) [hereinafter Lieberman Legislation].
10. See supra Part IV.A.
11. IASC Chronology (1973–2001), International Accounting Standards
Bureau, at para. 1, at http://www.iasc.org.uk/cmt/0001.asp?s=1400100&sc={A
29ECA6C-5273428A-8D42-DF0E2776131A}&n=90 (last visited Sept. 23,
2003).
12. Exposure Draft ED 2 Share-Based Payment, Int’l Accounting Standards
Bd., at 5 (Nov. 2002), available at http://www.iasc.org.uk/docs/ed02/ed02.pdf.
(last visited Sept. 23, 2003) [hereinafter IASB Exposure Draft]. See, e.g.,
AICPA, Letter to IASB Share Based Letter (Mar. 3, 2003), available at
http://www.aicpa. org/members/div/acctstd/comltrs/ iasb_share.htm.
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will provide investors with clearer disclosure than either the
U.S. standard or other standards adopted internationally.13
Part II of this Note explains how compensatory stock options
function as corporate securities. It then analyzes how and why
companies issue compensatory stock options as part of executive compensation packages. Part III first discusses the original
U.S. stock option accounting standard and the rationale behind
it. Second, it examines the subsequent proposed changes to
that standard, which ultimately were rejected. Finally, it considers the political melee that ensued, leading to the rejection of
the FASB’s proposed changes, and discusses the standard that
was adopted.
Part IV sets forth the history of the international accounting
standard-setting bodies, and then examines the international
response to the stock option disclosure controversy. This Part
also outlines the international option disclosure regulation currently being considered. Finally, Part V contends that compensatory stock options should be recognized as an expense on corporate financial statements in order to improve disclosure. It
also advocates, among other things, that such a standard
should be set by an international, rather than a national, standard-setting body.
II. STOCK OPTIONS AS A CORPORATE SECURITY
A stock option is a contract between the corporation and the
holder (“grantee”) that awards the grantee the right to purchase
a certain number of shares of the company’s underlying stock at
a stated price per share (typically known as either the “exercise
price” or “strike price” or “grant price”).14 This right usually
13. See Accounting for Share-Based Payment Project Summary, Int’l Accounting Standards Committee Found., July 22, 2002, at para. 1, at http://
www.iasc.org.uk/cmt/0001.asp?s=1406384&sc={3F02305A-2976-47E1-866A7FA492B49D31}&n=3318 (last visited Sept. 23, 2003) [hereinafter IASB
Summary].
14. Max J. Schwartz, PLI Tax Law and Estate Planning Course Handbook
Series, A Primer on Stock-Based Compensation and Selected Recent Developments, 537 PLI/TAX 9, 14 (2002); Eric L. Johnson, Waste Not, Want Not: An
Analysis of Stock Option Plans, Executive Compensation, and the Proper
Standard of Waste, 26 J. CORP. L. 145, at 146–48 (2002). See James M. Scannella, Payments in Cancellation of Stock Options, THE CPA J. ONLINE, July
1989, at para. 1, at http://www.nyscpa.org/cpajournal/old/07688672.htm (last
visited Nov. 7, 2002).
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vests over time, making the option exercisable at a future date.15
Both the exercise price and the underlying number of shares
granted can be determined either at the date of grant (“grant
date”) or at some point after the grant date.16 The grantee, in
turn, can exercise her option to purchase shares of the underlying stock at some point after the option vests or partially vests
and before it expires.17 The grantee, likely, will choose to exercise her option when the price per share of the underlying stock
exceeds the option’s exercise price, at which point she either
may retain the stock or sell it and realize a cash profit.18
15. Schwartz, supra note 14, at 14.
16. Id.
17. There are three basic exercise methods: (1) cash exercise, in which the
grantee pays the exercise price, together with the requisite transactional fees
and withholding taxes; (2) cashless exercise, in which the grantee uses a portion of her options to purchase shares of stock, which the grantee simultaneously sells to pay the transaction fees, exercise cost and withholding taxes (if
any) and (3) swap, in which the grantee uses company stock that she already
owns to cover the exercise cost, and the grantee will pay transaction fees and
withholding taxes, if applicable. The company provides for its exercise
method(s) in its stock option plan. Stock Option Basics, Charles Schwab, at
http://www.schwab.com/SchwabNOW/SNLibrary/SNLib123/SN123Article/0,56
37,872%7C4816,00.html (last visited Sept. 23, 2003). Additionally, a relatively new exercise method, the “West Coast Option” or “Reverse Vesting Option,” allows the grantee to exercise unvested options and receive it’s underlying stock, subject to a repurchase right by the company, which right will lapse
according to the option’s vesting schedule. Pamela B. Greene, Memorandum
Regarding Early Exercise of Unvested Options, 1 (Jan. 31, 2002) (unpublished
corporate form document produced by Mintz, Levin, Cohn, Ferris, Glovsky
and Popeo, P.C.) (on file with author).
18. In deciding whether to exercise a stock option, the grantee should take
account of several personal investment and tax considerations, including impact on capital gains taxes and on estate taxes. Sonja Lepkowski, Compensatory Stock Options, THE CPA J., Sept. 2000, at sub-heading When to Exercise
Options et. seq., at http://www.luca.com/cpajoural/2000/0900/dept/d95600a.
htm. When the market price of the underlying stock is below the exercise
price, the option is deemed “under water.” Bottom Line: Treat Options as an
Expense, MERCURY NEWS, May 30, 2002, at Definitions, at http://www.bay
area.com/mld/mercurynews/news/opinion/3364740.htm [hereinafter Bottom
Line]. Although under water options typically are not exercisable (because
the grantee could purchase the same number of shares on the open market for
less than the grantee’s exercise price), the under water options still have value
because the stock price can rebound before the option expires. Id. When an
option’s exercise price equals the market price of the underlying stock, the
option is deemed “at the money.” At the money, Investorwords.com, at
http://www.investorwords.com/cgi-bin/getword.cgi?319 (last visited Sept. 23,

File: EllenMacro3.doc

2003]

Created on: 10/21/2003 11:06 AM

Last Printed: 11/16/2003 9:27 PM

STOCK OPTION DISCLOSURE REFORM

285

Compensatory stock options are stock options granted to employees and consultants in payment of services rendered to the
issuing company.19 Typically, companies issue them as part of
an employment compensation package.20 Moreover, compensatory stock options usually are issued subject to a plan that has
been adopted by the issuing company’s board of directors and
stockholders.21 The plan sets forth the purposes, parameters
and requirements of the company’s compensatory stock program.22
There are two types of compensatory stock options: the first is
a statutory or “incentive” stock option (“ISO”), and the second is
a non-statutory or “nonqualified” stock option (“NSO”).23 Both
are so named to signify their respective tax treatment under the
Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended (“Code”).24 As one
author notes, “[t]he basic distinctions between these two types
of options are how the gain from the option is taxed and what
formal requirements the options must have. Generally, while
the incentive stock option is more tax-favored, the nonqualified
stock option is more flexible.”25

2003). When the market price exceeds the exercise price, the option is deemed
“in the money.” In the money, Investorwords.com, at http://www. Investor
words.com/cgibin/getword.cgi?2580&in%20the%20money (last visited Sept.
23, 2003).
19. Scannella, supra note 14.
20. Whitney Tilson, The Stock Option Travesty, THE MOTLEY FOOL, Mar.
20, 2002, at para 2, at http://www.fool.com/Server/FoolPrint.asp?File=/news/
foth/2002/foth020320. htm.
21. Marc H. Folladori, Disclosures Regarding Executive Officer and Director Compensation and Shareholder Approval of Compensation Plans, 1285
PLI/CORP 211, at 254 (2002).
22. See, e.g., Amazon.com, Inc. 1997 Stock Option Plan, Findlaw Corporate
Counsel Center, Findlaw.com, available at http://contracts.corporate.find
law.com/agreements/amzon/stockoption.1997.html (last visited Oct. 11, 2003).
23. Schwartz, supra note 14, at 15.
24. Id. The tax treatment in the Code refers to that of the grantee. Generally, ISO’s have a more favorable tax treatment under the Code than NSOs.
NSOs are regulated by § 83 of the Code and ISOs are regulated by § 421 and
§ 422 of the Code. Id. For more information regarding tax treatment of stock
options and other stock-based executive compensation, see id. at 15–24. See
Scott P. Spector, Significant Issues Relating to Stock-Based Compensation for
Executives, 503 PLI/TAX 745 (2001).
25. Johnson, supra note 14, at 147.
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A. Two Types of Compensatory Stock Options: ISOs and NSOs
ISOs were created by Congress as an instrument through
which companies could attract and retain qualified personnel,
particularly senior management.26 The “incentive” in the ISO
refers to a tax incentive provided in the Code to the grantee.27
For a stock option to be deemed an ISO, it must meet several
requirements set forth in the Code.28 First, an ISO must be
granted pursuant to an incentive stock plan, which must be approved by the company’s stockholders within twelve months of
the plan’s adoption by the Board of Directors.29 An ISO can be
granted only to an employee of the company issuing the option,
and the employee cannot transfer the ISO to a third party.30
Further, the option’s exercise price must equal or exceed the
fair market value of the underlying stock on the grant date, and
it “must be exercisable within ten years” of the grant date.31
Finally, as of the grant date, the employee must own less than
10% of the company’s voting stock.32
26. Id.
The legislative history of section 422 [of the Code] states that the retention of employees was one of Congress’ purposes in creating the
ISO. Further evidence of Congress’ intent is the requirement that
the person exercising the option must be an employee of the employer
granting the option “at all times during the period beginning on the
date of the granting of the option and ending on the day [three]
months before the date of such exercise.” This provision works in
tandem with another section 422 requirement – – if the employee exercises the option within two years of the granting, then she will no
longer qualify for the favored tax treatment. Therefore, the employee
would want to remain employed at least two years by the corporation,
so that any gain from the exercise she receives will not be taxed as
income.
Id. at 149.
27. Id. at 147.
28. Robert W. Wood, Executive Compensation, Stock Options and Golden
Parachutes, SG016 ALI-ABA 957, 960–961 (2001).
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. If at the time of the grant, the grantee owns more than 10% “of the
total combined voting power of all classes of stock” of the issuing company, or
one of its parents, subsidiaries or affiliates, as defined in § 424 of the Code,
the option’s grant price must equal at least 110% of the fair market value per
share as of the grant date. Anne Bruno & Pamela B. Greene, Plan Description
for Employee, Director and Consultant Stock Option Plan, 5 (Nov. 30, 2001)
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The “incentive” supplied in the Code refers to the fact that an
ISO grant can provide the grantee with better tax treatment
than an NSO grant.33 Under an ISO grant, the grantee is not
taxed when she exercises her option, but when she disposes of
the option’s underlying stock.34 Therefore, the grantee will not
be forced to pay the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) for the
income received until she actually realizes a cash profit from
the stock sale.35 Additionally, the ISO holder may qualify to
receive preferential capital gains tax treatment.36 However, to
reap this tax benefit, the ISO grantee must hold the option for
two years prior to exercising it.37 Additionally, the grantee then
must hold the underlying stock for at least one year before selling it.38
Unlike an ISO, an NSO is not subject to such rigorous statutory requirements, and thus, provides the company with greater
flexibility.39 Companies can grant NSOs to employees, consultants and others without being restricted by the option’s conditions or expiration date, at an option price above or below the
fair market value of the underlying stock.40 Under an NSO
grant, the grantee is taxed when she exercises her option.41 Although the purpose of an ISO is to provide the grantee prefer(unpublished corporate form document produced by Mintz, Levin, Cohn, Ferris, Glovsky and Popeo, P.C.) (on file with author). For all of the requirements
to be deemed an ISO, see I.R.C. § 422.
33. Schwartz, supra note 14, at 15–17.
34. Id. at 16.
35. See generally id. at 20–21.
36. Id.
37. Bruno & Greene, supra note 32, at 14.
38. Id. Pursuant to the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, under an ISO grant,
the grantee will receive beneficial (long-term capital gains) tax treatment if
she holds the underlying stock for more than twelve months after she exercises her option. Otherwise, the grantee will be taxed at the same rate as an
NSO grantee. Schwartz, supra note 14, at 16.
39. Schwartz, supra note 14, at 16–20; Johnson, supra note 14, at 147–48.
40. Wood, supra note 28, at 959.
41. Schwartz, supra note 14, at 16. The grantee must pay income tax on
the increased value of the option, which is the difference between the value of
the shares at exercise and the option’s exercise price. Interestingly, the issuing company can take a tax deduction on the same amount that the employee
is taxed. Bruno & Greene, supra note 32, at 14–15. Such compensation income of grantees may be subject to withholding taxes, and a deduction may
then be allowable to the company in an amount equal to the grantee’s compensation income. Id.
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ential tax treatment, due to the ISO’s holding requirements,
most ISO grantees never actually receive its tax benefit.42 Thus,
the benefit of an ISO grant to its employees is often a perceived
tax benefit, rather than an actual tax benefit.
B. Stock Option Rationale: Why Companies Issue Them as Executive Compensation
Granting stock options as part of an executive compensation
package became increasingly popular in the 1990s during the
explosion of high technology start-up companies.43 By the late
1990s, “more than eighty percent of the largest [U.S.] companies use[d] equity-based compensation to link executives to
long-term corporate performance. The long-term variable component of such pay comprise[d] sixty percent of the typical
CEO’s gross annual compensation.”44 The theoretical rationale
for this phenomenon is fourfold.
First, agency theorists argue that by linking a significant
percentage of an executive’s compensation to the price per share
of the of the company’s stock, “it will encourage the executive to
increase the firm’s profitability to achieve higher stock prices.”45
Thus, the executive will gain or lose personally, along with the
stockholders.46
Second, this link also aligns executives’ willingness to take
risks with that of the company’s stockholders.47 Corporate executives are typically risk-averse.48 However, if a CEO’s financial success is tied to that of her company, she will be more
likely to take greater risks so that her decisions will make

42. See id.
43. See Roberta S. Karmel, Securities Regulation the Fuss Over Stock Options, N.Y. L.J. 3 (June 20, 2002). “Equity-based compensation, and particularly stock options, helped to fuel the stock market bubble of the 1990s. Corporate executives were motivated to focus on stock market prices rather than
long-term profitability.” Id.
44. See Ellis, supra note 4, at 412–13.
45. Johnson, supra note 14, at 148. See Ellis, supra note 4, at 405. For a
discussion on the Agency-Cost Model, see Johnson, supra note 14, at 405–17.
46. Johnson, supra note 14, at 148. For a discussion of this insight from
the Agency-Cost Model and its potential shortcomings in describing actual
practice, see Ellis, supra note 4, at 405–17.
47. See Johnson, supra note 14, at 148–49.
48. Id.
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higher gains for the company’s stockholders, and for herself,
under a “nothing ventured, nothing gained” philosophy.49
Third, companies grant stock options to retain management.50
By establishing both a vesting period (typically over a number
of years) and a requirement that the employee remain employed
by the company in order to exercise her stock options, the company encourages the employee to be invested in her job.51 As a
corporate retention policy, the employee will weigh the additional cost of losing her unvested options before deciding to
leave her job.52
Finally, companies grant stock options as an inexpensive, yet
effective incentive to attract talented management whom, particularly at start-up companies, they could not afford to compensate in cash.53 Although start-up companies rarely have sufficient capital to attract qualified management with cash compensation, stock options can create potentially lucrative compensation packages due to the high growth potential of hightechnology, start-up companies.54
III. HISTORY OF U.S. ACCOUNTING PROCEDURE
A. Opinion No. 25, Accounting for Stock Issued to Employees
Although under accounting rules, including the GAAP,55 employee compensation is treated as a corporate expense,56 Accounting Principles Board Opinion No. 25, Accounting for Stock
Issued to Employees (“Opinion No. 25”)57 carves out “a rather
broad exemption from compensation accounting for certain
broad-based plans.”58 Opinion No. 25 sets forth regulations and
49. Id.
50. Id. at 149. See Christine I. Wiedman & Daniel J. Goldberg, Accounting
for Stock-Based Compensation: As Easy as SFAS 123?, IVEY BUS. J., July/Aug.
2001, 6, at 6–9.
51. Johnson, supra note 14, at 149.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 149–50. See Wiedman and Goldberg, supra note 50.
54. Johnson, supra note 14, at 149–50.
55. For a definition of GAAP, see supra note 3.
56. See generally Rouse & Barton, supra note 6.
57. Financial Accounting Standards, supra note 3.
58. Summary of Recent Accounting Literature Interpreting APB Opinion
No. 25, Accounting for Stock Issued to Employees, Ernst & Young, para. 13, at
http://www.ey.com/global/Content.nsf/US/AABS_-_Assurance__Articles__Inter
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accounting procedures for stock-based compensation given to
employees.59 Specifically, if a company adopts a broad-based
employee stock option plan that meets certain requirements set
forth in the Code, the company can avoid recognizing a compensation expense in its financial statement when it grants options
to its employees under that plan, even though it must recognize
such an expense for its employees’ salaries.60 The rationale behind this carve-out is that although, technically, all employee
stock option grants compensate employee grantees, the granting company adopts its compensatory stock plan to increase its
capital account (by paying less cash compensation to its employees in salaries and bonuses), to promote employee ownership of the company, or to align employee and corporate interests (by linking the employee’s compensation to the company’s
long-term financial success).61
When applying Opinion No. 25, the “compensation cost” or
“expense” of a stock option is measured by its intrinsic value,
which is the difference between a stock’s market price and its
exercise price on the measurement date.62 The measurement
date, “is the first date on which both (1) the number of shares
that an individual employee is entitled to receive and
(2) the...[exercise] price, if any, are known.”63 Moreover, the
plan’s expense “generally is recognized over the equity award’s
vesting period. Compensation [cost or] expense associated with

preting_APB_Opinion_No_25 (last visited Sept. 23, 2003) [hereinafter Ernst &
Young Summary]. For an list of criteria, see id. at paras. 14–17.
59. See generally Terry Grant & Conrad S. Ciccotello, The Stock Options
Accounting Subterfuge, STRATEGIC FIN. MAG., Apr. 2002, at 37, 41 [hereinafter,
Subterfuge].
60. Id. at para. 13. For a list of criteria, see id. at paras. 14–17. Compensatory stock options affect corporate financial statements in 3 ways: (1) as
options are exercised, the number of shares issued and outstanding increases,
diluting the per share price; (2) the cash payment of the exercise price to the
company generally is reflected in the annual report under the section entitled
“Cash Flows from Financing Activities;” and (3) the company receives a tax
deduction upon each exercise of a compensatory stock option. Tilson, supra
note 20, at para. 2.
61. Ernst & Young Summary, supra note 58, at para. 13.
62. Conrad S. Ciccotello & C. Terry Grant, Employee Stock Option Accounting Changes, J. OF ACCOUNTANCY, Jan. 1995, at 72 [hereinafter Accounting
Changes].
63. Ernst & Young Summary, supra note 58, at para. 18.
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awards that immediately are vested or attributable to past services is recognized when granted.”64
From 1972 until 1993, Opinion No. 25 governed disclosure of
compensatory stock options in profit and loss statements.65
Among other things, Opinion No. 25 provided that a stock option plan could be categorized either as compensatory or noncompensatory.66 Under a compensatory plan, the company can
grant either a fixed or variable award.67
A stock option grant is fixed if both the number of underlying
shares an employee can purchase and the exercise price are determined at the grant date.68 Under a fixed grant, because the
employee’s equity-based compensation is pre-determined, so
long as her option continues to vest (i.e. as long as the grantee
keeps her job), she will be able to exercise her stock option regardless of her actual employment performance.69 Assuming
the company’s stock increases in value from the grant date, the
employee will be able to exercise her option and realize a
profit.70
Conversely, a stock option grant is variable if either the number of underlying shares an employee can purchase or the exercise price is determinable only after the grant date.71 For example, under a variable stock option grant, the number of shares
granted to an employee could be contingent on realizing a performance target (such as going public, achieving a certain level
of efficiency or improving a certain technology) or the stock
market price maintaining a certain price per share.72 Because a
variable grant can be tailored to the accomplishment of a specific employee, it is commonly known as a “performance-based”
option grant.73
When the grant’s measurement date and grant date occur simultaneously, the compensation cost is determinable or “fixed”
64. Id.
65. Financial Accounting Standards, supra note 3.
66. Ernst & Young Summary, supra note 58, at para. 11.
67. Id.
68. Rouse & Barton, supra note 6, at 68. Ernst & Young Summary, supra
note 58, at para. 1.
69. Lepkowski, supra note 18, at sub-heading Incentive Stock Options.
70. See id.
71. Rouse & Barton, supra note 6, at 68.
72. Id.
73. Accounting Changes, supra note 62, at 72.
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at the grant date, and thus, the issuance is a fixed stock option
grant.74 Therefore, when a company grants a fixed stock option
at an exercise price that is equal to the market price of the underlying stock on the grant date, the company does not recognize any compensation expense on its financial statement.75
However, when a company grants a variable stock option, it
must estimate and accrue the option’s expense from the period
between the grant date and the ultimate measurement date.76
Due to the tax implications of Opinion No. 25, fixed option
grants are more favorable than variable grants because fixed
grant compensatory stock options have no intrinsic value when
granted. Thus, the company incurs no expense.77 Furthermore,
although a variable option grant can be exercised only if the
stated target is met, making it less valuable to the grantee than
a fixed option grant, the variable grant is more expensive for
the issuing company than the fixed grant because the variable
grant likely will cause a compensation expense to be charged to
the company.78 As commentators Rouse and Barton point out,
the preferred tax treatment given to the fixed option grant
“seems counterintuitive.”79 Accordingly, the FASB began studying stock compensation in an effort to resolve these discrepancies.80
B. SFAS 123 Accounting for Stock-Based Compensation
1. The Draft Proposal
Opinion No. 25 inadvertently encouraged companies to issue
fixed compensatory stock options with an exercise price equal to
the market price on the grant date, thereby intentionally creating a grant with no intrinsic value.81 After years of debate over
the growing need for clarity or “transparency” of compensatory
stock options on financial statements, and in light of the increased use of fixed stock options as compensation for senior
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Id. at para. 19; Rouse & Barton, supra note 6, at 68.
Ernst & Young Summary, supra note 58, at para. 20.
Accounting Changes, supra note 62, at 72.
Rouse & Barton, supra note 6, at 68.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

File: EllenMacro3.doc

2003]

Created on: 10/21/2003 11:06 AM

Last Printed: 11/16/2003 9:27 PM

STOCK OPTION DISCLOSURE REFORM

293

executives, the FASB reversed its opinion on the compensatory
stock option carve-out for employees and directors.82 The FASB
stated publicly that all compensatory stock option grants should
be accounted for as an expense to the issuing company.83 In
reaching this conclusion, the FASB recognized that because
compensatory stock options were being used regularly as a significant percentage of senior executives’ compensation packages, increased corporate disclosure was needed to provide investors with the requisite information to make sound investment decisions.84
In 1993, the FASB issued its Exposure Draft of SFAS 123 Accounting for Stock-Based Compensation (“FASB Exposure
Draft”) to close the loophole created by Opinion No. 25.85 The
FASB Exposure Draft required companies to recognize all
grants of compensatory stock options as expenses in their income statements.86 Moreover, the FASB Exposure Draft required the expense to be measured using the fair value of the
option’s underlying stock at the grant date, instead of its intrinsic value as required by Opinion No. 25.87 The FASB adopted
the fair value method because, although the intrinsic value
method would be much easier to calculate, it believed that fair
value better represented an option’s true value. Under the fair
value method,
compensation cost is measured at the grant date and is recognized over the service period (typically the vesting period).
82. Alan Levinsohn, Stock-Option Accounting Battle Resumes After SevenYear Détente, STRATEGIC FIN., June 2002, at 63.
83. Id. The FASB based its opinion on the fact that compensatory stock
options are issued to employees as compensation for services rendered to the
company. Id. Christine A. Botosan and Marlene A. Plumlee, in their study on
the effects of stock option expense, studied one hundred companies named by
Fortune Magazine as “America’s Fastest-Growing Companies” and found that:
(1) for a majority of its sample companies, the impact of stock option expense
is material; (2) within the next three to five years, stock option expense would
“become even more economically significant” and (3) there is a segment of the
corporate population that currently is not in compliance with SFAS 123.
Christine A. Botosan & Marlene A. Plumlee, Stock Option Expense: The
Sword of Damocles Revealed, ACCOUNTING HORIZONS, Dec. 2001, at 312, 325.
84. Rouse & Barton, supra note 6, at 68.
85. Subterfuge, supra note 59, at 41.
86. Id.
87. FASB Issues Proposal on Stock Option Compensation, J. OF
ACCOUNTANCY, Sept. 1993, at 23.
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Fair value is determined using an option pricing model (such
as Black-Scholes or a binomial pricing mode) that takes into
account the grant date, the exercise price, the expected life of
the option, the current price of the underlying stock, its expected volatility, expected dividends on the stock, and the riskfree interest rate over the expected life of the option.88

By requiring companies to use the fair value method instead
of the intrinsic value method, the FASB Exposure Draft required companies to capture on the income statements the increase in value that option grantees would recognize over their
option’s vesting period.89
2. The Proposal as Adopted
Public response to the FASB Exposure Draft was unambiguous and overwhelmingly negative.90 The U.S. business commu88. Wiedman & Goldberg, supra note 50, at 6. Additionally, under the
GAAP, “most exchange transactions” are stated based on the clearer of the
fair value of the consideration given or of the item received. However, Opinion No. 25 used the intrinsic value method instead of fair value because it was
generally accepted that the underlying stock value was too difficult or tenuous
to calculate. Rouse & Barton, supra note 6, at 69. For a description and
analysis of the binomial pricing mode, see Stefan Winter, Tax and accounting
implications of sequential stock options grants, Research Report 2001–1, University of Wuerzburg, Faculty of Business and Economics, Chair of Business
Administration, Personnel, and Organization, at 7–8 (Mar. 2001). An option
pricing model is a mathematical formula used to determine the theoretical
fair value of an option. Option Pricing Models, at sub-heading Option pricing
models, Australian Stock Exchange, at http://www.asx.com.au/markets/l4/
PricingModels_AM4.shtm (last visited Sept. 23, 2003). The two most widely
used option pricing models are the Black-Scholes option pricing model and the
binomial option pricing model. The binomial pricing model was developed by
Cox, Ross and Rubinstein and published in 1979. Id. at The binomial pricing
model. For a summary of the binomial model, see id. The Black-Scholes formula was develop by economists Fischer Black and Myron Scholes in 1973. In
1997, Black, who had died in 1995, and Scholes were awarded the Nobel Price
in Economics for their options-pricing model. Bottom Line, supra note 18. For
a description of both of the Black-Scholes Pricing Model and Binomial Model,
see Option Pricing Models and the “Greeks”, Peter Hoadley’s Options Strategy
Analysis Tools, at http://www.hoadley.net/options/BS.htm#Binomial (last visited Sept. 23, 2003).
89. Rouse & Barton, supra note 6, at 69.
90. Botosan & Plumlee, supra note 83, at 313. For example, Thomas M.
Foster, Vice President and Controller of Phelps-Dodge Corp. said, “Like most
accountants, I think the FASB’s efforts are a waste of time. It shouldn’t try to
develop noncash charges that essentially don’t provide financial statement
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nity came out in force to renounce the FASB Exposure Draft as
detrimental to industry and to the economy for the same reason
that the FASB saw the need to act: expensing compensatory
stock options could reduce the profit reflected on a company’s
financial statement by a significant percentage and, in turn,
force a change in the manner and degree of compensation to
employees and senior executives.91
Opposition to the FASB Exposure Draft was threefold. Companies argued that the new measure was extremely subjective,92
accountants argued that the theories behind the technical
changes were too difficult to comprehend,93 and both agreed that
the FASB Exposure Draft would have an adverse impact on
small, start-up companies.94 In one prominent complaint, the
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (“AICPA”)
users with any useful information.” Lieberman Legislation, supra note 9, at
16. The FASB received over one thousand, seven hundred comment letters on
the FASB Exposure Draft, many of them before the draft was released to the
public. Botosan & Plumlee, supra note 83.
91. Rouse & Barton, supra note 6, at 70. For example, had America
Online, Inc. applied the FASB Exposure Draft rules in 1992, it would have
reduced AOL’s earnings of 40 cents per share by at least 25%. Roula Khalif, If
It Ain’t Broke…, FORBES, Apr. 12, 1993, at 100. Had the FASB Exposure
Draft measure been applied in 2000, Cisco Systems, Inc.’s earnings would
have been reduced by 40% and WorldCom, Inc.’s earnings would have been
reduced by 14%. Geoffrey Colvin, Losing the Good Fight, FORTUNE, Apr. 15,
2002, at 75. Colvin also points out that Cisco’s per share price is down 79%,
and WorldCom’s per share price is down 84%, after which he asks whether
reporting lower earnings “would have been a bad thing.” Id. In 2001, application of the FASB Exposure Draft would have reduced the Standard & Poor’s
500-stock index earnings-per-share in excess of 24%. Duncan Hughes, Now
the Fed Enters Standards Battle, ACCOUNTANCYAGE.COM, July 25, 2002, para.
10, at http://www.acountancyage.com/ Analysis/1130141.
92. Khalif, supra note 91.
93. Rouse & Barton, supra note 6, at 70. “Opponents to recognition of
stock-based compensation expense also believe that the value of employee
stock options cannot be measured reliably because existing option value estimation technology is not suitable for employee options, which have unique
characteristics, and estimation of option values requires exercise of substantial management discretion.” David Aboody, Mary E. Barth and Ron Kasznik,
SFAS 123 Stock-Based Compensation Expense and Equity Market Values,
July 2001, at 2.
94. Accounting Changes, supra note 62, at 73–77. For an example and
analysis on how the FASB Exposure Draft would affect small versus large
companies, see id. at 37–39. See also Lyn Perlmuth, Hanging Tough on Stock
Options, INSTITUT’L INVESTOR, Nov. 1994, at 172.
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submitted a public response letter to the FASB Exposure Draft
claiming, among other things, that the amended disclosure policies would not provide any additional transparency to the investing public and that the disclosure policy provided for in
Opinion No. 25 continued to produce reliable results.95
Furthermore, in response to the public outcry from individuals and organizations lobbying for business interests, both the
U.S. Senate and the House of Representatives entered the debate. Several members of Congress supported a “Sense of Congress Resolution” against the FASB Exposure Draft.96 Additionally, Senator Joseph Lieberman of Connecticut introduced
S. 1175, the Equity Expansion Act of 1993,97 a bill that would
require the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) to
overrule the FASB Exposure Draft, effectively revoking the
FASB’s rule-making authority.98 Although S. 1175 never came
to a vote on the Senate floor,99 the bill had sufficient support to
pass.100

95. AsSEC Comments on FASB’s Stock Option Proposal, J. OF
ACCOUNTANCY, Mar. 1994, 9. Walter Schueltze, then the SEC’s chief accountant, in his address to the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
(“AICPA”), noted that initially, most major accounting firms backed expensing
stock options, and that he found the recent reversal troubling. Schueltze
pointed out that the change of heart, “left members of the public with the impression [that] the switch was in response to a fear of losing clients or other
forms of retaliation.” Schultze Wary over CPA Independence on Stock Option
Proposal, J. OF ACCOUNTANCY, Mar. 1994, 9.
96. Grace Hinchman, Fasten Seat Belts: Bumpy Ride for Stock Option Accounting, FIN. EXECUTIVE, Sept. 2001, at 68, available at http://www.fei.org/
magazine/articles/9 2001_washington.cfm. The resolution was introduced by
Representative Anna Eshoo of California and former Senator Bill Bradley of
New Jersey. Id. A “Sense of Congress Resolution” merely articulates Congress’ opinion, but has no statutory authority. Id.
97. Equity Expansion Act of 1993, S. 1175, 103d Cong. (1993).
98. Lieberman Legislation, supra note 9, at 15. Lieberman argued that the
FASB Exposure Draft, if adopted, would be detrimental as a matter of public
policy. Id. Lieberman was joined by members of both political parties in condemning the FASB Exposure Draft and promoting S. 1175. Id.
99. The bill never came to a vote because the FASB caved into political
pressure and revised the FASB Exposure Draft to remove the expensing requirement. See Hinchman, supra note 96.
100. Id. More than 60 Senators supported S. 1175. Id. Representative
Nancy Johnson of Connecticut and Representative Lewis Payne of Virginia
submitted H.R. 2759, a companion bill to S. 1175. Lieberman Legislation,
supra note 9, at 15.
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However, a small but distinguished minority supported, and
continue to support, the principles set forth in the FASB Exposure Draft. During the initial controversy, Senator Carl Levin
of Michigan and Representative John Bryant of Texas vocally
opposed S. 1175.101 Additionally, as far back as 1985, Warren
Buffet, CEO and Chairman of the Board of Directors of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.,102 made clear his position that compensatory stock options should be expensed.103 He explained that,
among other things, “it is both silly and cynical to say that an
important item of cost should not be recognized simply because
it can’t be quantified with pinpoint precision.”104
101. Senator Carl Levin and Representative John Bryant sent a letter to
their fellow members of Congress urging them to support the FASB Exposure
Draft. Their letter said, “[i]t is time to bring stock options under the rules of
ordinary compensation.” Lieberman Legislation, supra note 9, at 15–16.
Senator Levin also stated that “[compensatory] stock options are the only kind
of compensation that companies can deduct from their taxes as an expense but
don’t have to include in their books as an expense.” Perlmuth, supra note 94.
102. Berkshire Hathaway Inc. is an Omaha-based holding company with
more than $2 billion in holdings and owns thirty-six subsidiaries, including
property and casualty insurance and reinsurance businesses like GEICO Corporation and General Re Corporation, and other businesses as diverse as Benjamin Moore and Dairy Queen. BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC., 2001 ANNUAL
REPORT, Inside Cover, 72, available at http://www.berkshirehatway.com/2001
ar/2001ar.pdf. The company also maintains significant holdings (approximately 10%) in several multinational corporations, including American Express Company, The CocaCola Company, The Gillette Company, H&R Block,
Inc., Moody’s Corporation, The Washington Post and Wells Fargo and Company, as well as other insurance and reinsurance companies. Id. at Inside
Cover. Warren Buffet took over Berkshire Hathaway in 1965. At that time,
stock was trading at $18 per share. Today, Berkshire Hathaway stock trades
at more than $70,000 per share. John Price, The Return of the Buffetteers,
Warren Buffet Meets Sherlock Homes, reprinted with permission from
INVESTOR J., (Aug. 1998), available at http://www.sherlockinvesting.com/art
icles/buffetteers.htm (last visited Sept. 23, 2003).
103. 1985 Annual Letter from Warren E. Buffet to the shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc. (Mar. 4, 1986), at http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/
letters/1985.html.
104. 1992 Annual Letter from Warren E. Buffet to the shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc. (Mar. 1, 1993), at http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/let
ters/1992.html [hereinafter 1992 Annual Letter]. In his 1992 annual letter,
Buffet, addressing Berkshire Hathaway’s stockholders, stated,
It seems to me that the realities of stock options can be summarized
quite simply: If options aren’t a form of compensation, what are they?
If compensation isn’t an expense, what is it? And, if expenses
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The FASB claimed to be beyond the sway of political pressure,105 yet it appears that in fear of losing its autonomy and
authority, the FASB succumbed to it, nonetheless.106 When
SFAS 123 was adopted in October 1995107 in its final form, it did
not require companies to recognize options as expenses in their
financial statements. Instead, it permitted companies to choose
between recognition of options as an expense on financial
statements and disclosure of such options in footnotes.108 Moreover, SFAS 123 does not require calculation and disclosure of
“the annual charge for stock option expense”109 by using “the
total fair value of options granted during the year. Instead,
firms amortize the total fair value over the period(s) in which
the related services are rendered.”110
shouldn’t go into the calculation of earnings, where in the world
should they go?
Id.
105. Diana Willis, FASB Project Manager, stated that although the FASB
would take the controversy into account, “[p]olitics is not a factor in the
board’s deliberations.” Perlmuth, supra note 94. But see Hinchman, supra
note 96 (noting that Dennis Beresford, former Chairman of the FASB, admitted that the FASB’s decision not to require companies to expense compensatory stock options was heavily influenced by it’s fear of congressional intervention). James Lensing, former Vice Chairman of the FASB, stated that the
FASB had not changed its opinion of the need for companies to expense compensatory stock options, but the FASB’s concern over being overruled by Congress forced the FASB to abandon its policy. Id.
106. Botosan & Plumlee, supra note 83.
107. Haksu Kim, Statement of Financial Accounting Standards 123, Pacific
Inv. Research, Inc., at http://www.fawpir.com/standard/sfas123.htm (last visited Sept. 23, 2003).
108. Botosan & Plumlee, supra note 83. See SFAS No. 123, para 11. From
1995 until the aftermath of Enron and WorldCom, almost without exception,
companies opted for footnote disclosure over expense recognition. Id. at 312.
For a description of the Enron and WorldCom accounting troubles, see infra
notes 132 and 133, respectively.
109. Botosan & Plumlee, supra note 83, at 313.
110. Id. at 313. See SFAS No. 123, para. 30. SFAS 123
encourages [companies] to recognize [options’] expense in reported
net income, but allows them to continue using the intrinsic value
method prescribed by [Opinion No.] 25 for recognition purposes.
[Companies] using [Opinion No.] 25 must provide footnote disclosures
of pro forma net income and earnings per share computed using the
fair value method.
Id. at para. 11. For a summary of SFAS No. 123, see Financial Accounting
Standards Board Summary of Statement No. 123, at http://www.fasb.org
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IV. INTERNATIONAL ACCOUNTING COMMUNITY REACTION
A. History and Composition of the International Accounting
Standards Board
Since the inception of the International Accounting Standards Committee (“IASC”) in 1973, the international community has had its own accounting standard-setting body.111 In the
early 1990s, the IASC focused much of its attention on internal
restructuring to create a more comprehensive international
standard-setting body. In 1993, an interim group known as
G4+1 formed in order to continue reviewing accounting issues
and to set standards for use by the international community
while the IASC was in the process of restructuring.112 Recently,
the IASC restructured its membership, revised its constitution,113 and in 2001, took the form of the International Accounting Standards Board (“IASB”),114 at which time, G4+1 disbanded.115 The IASB is a London-based, privately-funded, independent body, the goal of which is to create a universal, comprehensible and enforceable set of accounting standards.116
/st/summary/stsum123.shtml (last visited Sept. 23, 2003). See Kim, supra
note 107.
111. See IASC Chronology, supra note 11. The state accountancy agencies
of Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands, the
United Kingdom, Ireland, and the U.S. formed the IASC. Id. Over the next
twenty-five years, states continued to join the IASC as it created a set of accounting standards to be used universally. These standards have become
widely used outside the U.S. See generally id. However, the U.S. never
adopted the IASC standards. Instead, it continues to follow the GAAP set by
the FASB.
112. G4+1 is an association of the accounting standards-setting bodies of
each of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the U.S.
IASC Involvement with G4+1 Projects, IAS Plus, Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu,
Para. 1, at http://www.iasplus.com/agenda/g4.htm (last visited Nov. 7, 2002).
The IASC contributed to G4+1 projects, in its capacity as an observer. Id. at
para. 3. For a summary of G4+1’s objectives and goals, see G4+1, Financial
Accounting Standards Board, at http://www.fasb.org /IASC/G4+1.shtml (last
visited Nov. 7, 2002).
113. IASC Chronology, supra note 11, at sub-heading 2000.
114. Id. at sub-heading 2001.
115. Since the IASB was ready to begin formally, G4+1 agreed to disband at
its January 30, 2001 meeting. IASC Involvement with G4+1 Projects, supra
note 112, at para. 1.
116. About Us, Mission Statement, International Accounting Standards
Bureau, at http://www.iasc.org.uk/cmt/0001.asp?n=57&s=1400100&sc={A29E
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Before it disbanded, G4+1 reviewed compensatory stock option disclosure policies and published its findings in Accounting
for Share-Based Payments (“G4+1 Study”).117 Among other
things, the study concluded that companies should recognize an
expense in their financial statements for all transactions for
goods and services with employees and suppliers in consideration for stock options, “with a corresponding charge to the income statement when those goods or services are consumed.”118
It also determined that the expense should be calculated using
the fair value of the option’s underlying stock,119 which should
be calculated using an option pricing model (such as BlackScholes or the binomial method).120 Further, it specified that the
measurement date should be the vesting date (and not the
grant date),121 and the vesting date should be the date the option
becomes unconditionally exercisable.122
B. IASB Decides to Expense Compensatory Stock Options
In an effort to hold itself out as a truly independent standardsetting organization and to slay the toughest dragons first,123 the
CA6C-5273-428A-8D42-DF0E2776131A}&sd=314418309 (last visited Sept. 23,
2003) [hereinafter IASB Mission Statement]. Among others, the member
states of the European Union and Australia follow IASB standards. T.R.
Reid, Options Must Be Treated as Expenses, Global Panel Says, WASH. POST,
July 17, 2002, at E4.
117. Discussion Paper, G4+1 Position Paper: Accounting for Share-Based
Payment, International Accounting Standards Committee (2000), available at
http://www.iasc.org.uk/docs/g4sp00/g4sp00.pdf.
G4+1 Study Share-Based
Payments (Stock Compensation), IAS Plus, Deloitte Touche Tomatsu, at
http://www.iasplus.com/agenda/g4share.htm (last visited Sept. 23, 2003)
[hereinafter D&T on G4+1]. Accounting for Share-Based Payments was published in 2000. Id. at sub-heading Published.
118. Id.
119. Id. at para. 1.
120. See supra note 88.
121. D&T on G4+1, supra note 117, at paras. 1–2.
122. Id. at para 3. G4+1 made its draft public for commentary and feedback. For a summary of the comment letters submitted by the five major accounting firms, see G4+1 Discussion Paper – “Share-based Payments” Summary of “Big 5” Comment Letters, at http://www.fei.org/advocacy/download/
G41CommentLettermary.pdf#xml=http://fei.org.master.com/texis/master/sear
ch/mysite.txt?q=%22sharebased+compensation%22&order=r&id=70683809c2
d02f1&cmd=xml (last visited Sept. 23, 2003).
123. Rob Urban, International Accounting Board Fighting to Restore Confidence, CALGARY HERALD, June 30, 2002, D9, available at http://www.kellogg.
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IASB agreed to pick up where G4+1 left off in creating an international, definitive set of accounting standards to deal with
disclosure of compensatory stock options.124 In September 2001,
the IASB adopted the G4+1 Study, incorporating it into its own
summary (“IASB Summary”), in which it reviewed the project’s
history and the findings of G4+1. 125 The IASB Summary made
preliminary determinations on disclosure requirements for
stock-based compensation in financial statements,126 which it
solidified in its exposure draft, released on November 7, 2002
(“IASB Exposure Draft”).127 As part of its analysis, the IASB
noted that while few countries had an accounting standard for
share-based payments, without exception, those countries that
had considered the issue concluded that compensatory stock
options should be expensed.128

northwestern.edu/news/hits/020630ch.htm. Urban notes that some politicians
and accountants believe that the FASB, “relies too much on specific rules,
which allow companies to violate the spirit of accounting standards and still
comply with GAAP.” Id. Kimberly Crook of the IASB has stated that the
although the FASB deems expensing stock options the appropriate disclosure
method, such disclosure is not compulsory in the U.S., “because the Americans
have made this a political issue, not an accounting question.” Reid, supra
note 116.
124. IASB Summary, supra note 13. The IASB released its exposure draft
on November 7, 2002. Projects in Progress, Int’l Accounting Standards Bureau, at sub-heading Timetable, at http://www.iasc.org.uk/cmt/0001.asp?s=
1506247&sc={A54F497F-149B-4F27-99A3-F0F9CC72CC19}&n=66 (last visited Sept. 23, 2003).
125. See IASB Observer Notes, June 21, 2001, at http://www.iasc.org.uk/
docs/acpapers/200206/0206ob05.pdf.
126. IASB Summary, supra note 13.
127. See IASB Exposure Draft, supra note 12.
128. Id. at 1. As part of its review, the IASB considered each of the G4+1’s
draft policy entitled “Accounting for Share-Based Payment,” the German Accounting Standards Committee’s draft accounting standard entitled “Accounting for Share Option Plans and Similar Compensation Arrangements,” the
Danish Institute of State Authorized Public Accountants’ Discussion Paper
entitled “Accounting Treatment of Share-Based Payment,” SFAS 123 and the
Canadian Accounting Standards Board’s accounting standard entitled “Stockbased Compensation and Other Stock-based Payments.” Id. at 1–2. For a
summary of each analysis, see id.
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Therefore, it is not surprising that the IASB, like its predecessors, plans to require companies to recognize compensatory
stock options as an expense on their financial statements,129
which will be measured using the fair value of an option’s underlying stock as of the grant date.130 The IASB also proposed
that all companies, both public and private, be required to calculate the expense of their compensatory stock options using
the fair value method.131

129. IASB Exposure Draft, supra note 12, at 19. IASB Summary, supra
note 13, at 4. For a detailed analysis of the IASB Summary, see IASB Technical Agenda Project Share-Based Payment, IAS Plus, Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu, at http://www.iasplus.com/agenda/share.htm (last visited Sept. 23,
2003) [hereinafter Technical Agenda]. The IASB reviewed the disclosure approach adopted by SFAS 123, but rejected it as an inadequate alternative for
recognition. Id. at sub-heading Recognition vs. disclosure.
130. IASB Exposure Draft, supra note 12, at 16; IASB Summary, supra note
13, at 4. See Technical Agenda, supra note 129, at sub-heading Fundamental
Decisions. Before adopting the grant date as the measurement date, the IASB
considered using each of the grant date, service date (“the date at which the
employee performs the services necessary to become unconditionally entitled
to an option”), vesting date and exercise date. Id. at sub-heading Measurement date. The IASB also met with Myron Scholes, the Nobel Prize winning
co-drafter of the Black-Scholes valuation method, after which the IASB agreed
with Scholes that, “it is possible to reliably estimate [sic] the fair value of
share options.” Id. at sub-heading Reliable measurement. However, the IASB
does not plan to require companies to use a particular valuation method. Id.
at sub-heading Valuation method.
131. IASB Exposure Draft, supra note 12, at 16. Technical Agenda, supra
note 129, at sub-heading Fundamental Decisions. By choosing the fair value
measurement base, the IASB rejected each of the historical cost, intrinsic
value and minimum value bases. Id. at sub-heading Measurement bases.
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C. Reaction to the IASB’s Plan to Require Expensing Stock Options
In the wake of corporate accounting scandals like Enron132
and WorldCom133 that consumed international attention beginning in 2001, and in anticipation of the IASB’s proposed option
disclosure requirements, public debate again has turned to corporate transparency and the expensing of compensatory stock
options. Unlike in the early 1990s, public response appears to
be more balanced. While U.S. companies generally continue to
hold their ground by insisting that an expensing requirement
would damage corporate financials severely and impact employee compensation choices, both national and international
support for the IASB plan has grown.134
132. Enron, Inc. is a Houston-based energy trading company, which filed for
bankruptcy protection after disclosing, among other things, that over the last
five years, it falsely reported its earnings. Oliver Willis, EnronGate, at
http://www.oliverwillis.com/enrongate/ (last visited Nov. 7, 2002). For continuing updates on the Enron scandal, along with a link to all public documents filed in connection with the ongoing investigations and suits, see FindLaw Special Coverage Enron, Findlaw.com, at http://news.findlaw.com/lega
news/lit/enron/ (last visited Sept. 23, 2003); See Stephanie J. Burke, The Collapse of Enron: A Bibliography of Online Legal, Government and Legislative
Resources, at http://www.llrx.com/features/enron.htm (last visited Sept. 23,
2003). But see Public Comment Letter from the International Employee Stock
Option Coalition (“IESOC”) to David Tweedie, IASB Chairman (Dec. 31, 2001)
(in which the IESOC calls for the IASB to adopt the SFAS 123 model), at
http://www.americanbenefitscouncil.org/issues/other/iesoc_1214.pdf [hereinafter IESOC Comment Letter]. However, the IESOC is largely comprised of
U.S. corporations and organizations. For a complete list of its members, see
id.
133. WorldCom Corp. is a Clinton, Mississippi–based long-distance telecommunications company that was forced by the SEC to restate downwardly
its financials. The SEC filed fraud charges against the company after an internal audit proved “that almost $4 billion of expenses in 2001 and $797 million in the first quarter of 2002 were wrongly listed on company books as capital expenses, thus not reflected in its earnings results.” MSNBC News, SEC
Files Fraud Charges Against WorldCom (June 26, 2002), at http://stacks.
msnbc.com/news/772330.asp?cp1=1#BODY. See Jake Ulick, WorldCom’s Financial Bomb, CNNMONEY, June 26, 2002, at http://money.cnn.com/2002/06/
25/news/ worldcom/.
134. AIMR, the Association for Investment Management and Research, is
an international, non-profit, professional society of fifty-eight thousand investment professionals, headquartered in Charlottesville, Virginia, with offices in Hong Kong and London. Analysts Association AIMR Wants FASB to
Follow IASB Plan to Require Companies to Expense Stock Option Costs, July
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Once again, particularly in the U.S., debate over expensing
has amplified. This time, proponents of expensing include the
notable addition of PricewaterhouseCoopers Chief Executive
Officer, Samuel DiPiazza, Jr.135 DiPiazza favors the adoption of
international principles that will “mak[e] financial reporting
more relevant to investors.”136
U.S. lawmakers, again, have attempted to legislate a resolution to stock option expensing. There has been an onslaught of
bills submitted to the House and Senate.137 Most notably, Sena17, 2002, at para. 10, at http://www.aimr.org/pressroom/02releases/02fasb_st
ockopt.html. In July 2002, AIMR’s Senior Vice President, Patricia Doran
Walters, reiterated the organization’s long-held stance that although most
corporations would prefer to continue under SFAS 123 and its international
progeny, AIMR strongly affirms its belief that stock options should be expensed. Id. at paras. 2–3. In its September 2001 international survey of financial analysts and portfolio managers, AIMR found that among its respondents: (1) 88% agreed that stock option plans are forms of compensation to the
grantees; (2) 83% agreed that, “the accounting method for employee stock
options should require recognition of an expense in the income statement;”
and (3) 81% acknowledged that they consider stock options when appraising a
company’s performance and establishing its value. Id. at para. 7. For a
breakdown of AIMR’s survey results, see Survey on Accounting for Stock Options, at http://www.aimr.com/advocacy/02commltr/02sharebsd_c.html (last
visited Sept. 23, 2003). But see IESOC Comment Letter, supra note 132, (requesting that the IASB adopt SFAS 123 as its disclosure policy). The IESOC
is a Washington D.C.–based organization comprised largely of U.S. corporations and organizations. For a list of the IESOC’s members see id. See also
Corey Rosen, Update for January 7, 2002, sub-heading Opposition to IASB
Accounting Proposal, IRS Withholding Proposal Grows, The National Center
for Employee Ownership, at http://www.nceo.org/columns/cr103.html (last
visited Sept. 23, 2003).
135. John S. McLenahen, GAAP Goodbye? PwC’s CEO wants to Scrap
Rules-based Accounting for Global Guidelines, INDUSTRYWEEK.COM, Aug.
2002, at 17.
136. Id. at 17–18. DiPiazza’s belief in a global standard in lieu of GAAP, in
part, stems from the fact that, “the current U.S. GAAP begins with a principle
but then moves to dozens and dozens of rules and exceptions, all designed to
appease somebody out there in the market.” Id. at 18.
137. A small sampling of current bills introduced into Congress in 2002
regarding stock options include: (1) Prevention of Stock Option Abuse Act,
S. 2822, 107th Cong. (2002); (2) To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986
to clarify the treatment of incentive stock options and employee stock purchase plans, H.R. 2695, 107th Cong. (2001), (which would exclude ISO’s and
employee stock purchase plans from being considered as wages); (3) Stock
Option Fairness and Accountability Act, S. 2760, 107th Cong. (2002);
(4) Workplace Employee Stock Option Act of 2002, H.R. 5242, 107th Cong.
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tors Levin and McCain, together with Senators Fitzgerald,
Durbin and Dayton, re-introduced S. 1940 entitled “Ending the
Double Standards for Stock Options Act,” which initially was
introduced in 1997, but has gained wide exposure since February 2002.138 Under current U.S. regulations, companies can
treat stock options as an expense on tax returns, but refrain
from treating them as an expense on their financial statements.139 If passed, the Act would require companies to treat
stock options uniformly in both their profit and loss statements
and their tax returns.140 Thus, if a company claims a tax deduction for a stock option expense on its tax return, it also must
disclose the same expense in its financial statement.141 However, the bill does not require that companies unilaterally expense stock options or dictate the accounting method by which
companies must expense their options.142 By tying the company’s corporate tax deduction directly to the amount expensed
on the company’s financial statement,143 the bill seeks to achieve

(2002); (5) Rank and File Stock Option Act of 2002, S. 2877, 107th Cong.
(2002); (6) Stock Option Accounting Reform Act, H.R. 5147, 107th Cong.
(2002). To access bills on stock options, see the United States Senate official
web site, at http://www.senate.gov/index.htm (last visited Sept. 23, 2003).
138. Ending the Double Standards for Stock Options Act, S. 1940, 107th
Cong. (2002). See also Press Release, Senator John McCain of Arizona,
McCain Cosponsors Ending Double Standards for Stock Options Act (Feb. 13,
2002), at http://www.mccain.senate.gov/stockops.htm [hereinafter McCain
Press Release]. In 1993, Levin introduced a similar bill, S. 576 entitled “Corporate Executives Stock Option Accountability Act,” which the Senate rejected
by an eighty-eight to nine vote. Senators Levin and McCain Introduce the
“Ending the Double Standard for Stock Options Act”, The Nat’l Ass’n of Stock
Plan Professionals, Feb. 15, 2002, at http://www.naspp.com/miscContent/0215
2002-StockOptionsDoubleStandard.htm, at para. 3 [hereinafter NASP on
S. 1940]; Alan Reynolds, Stock Options and the Levin-McCain Double Standard, The Institute for Policy Innovation, Apr. 2, 2002, at http://www.ipi.org;
Lesli S. Laffie, McCain-Levin Stock Options Bill, THE TAX ADVISOR, Aug. 1997,
at 472.
139. McCain Press Release, supra note 138, at para. 2.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. at para. 8.
143. Expensing Stock Options – Not an Option, Am. Electronics Ass’n, at
http://www.aeanet.org/govermnentalaffairs/gaet_stockoptionsbasic.asp
(last
visited Nov. 7, 2002) [hereinafter AeA on S. 1940].
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consistent, fair disclosure.144 In April 2002, President Bush implicitly rejected S. 1940 by publicly supporting the continuance
of FASB 123,145 signaling that he is likely to veto it if passed.
It is worth noting that the bill’s sponsors framed their argument in the context of the Enron scandal.146 Both Senators
Levin and McCain point out that between 1996 and 2000, Enron issued close to $600 million in compensatory stock options,
for which it earned $600 million in tax deductions.147 Levin and
McCain argue that the crux of the Enron debacle is that the
company received the benefit of a $600 million tax deduction
without disclosing the burden of $600 million in lost profits.148
Had Enron also reported the $600 million as an expense on its
144. McCain Press Release, supra note 138, at para. 7. In his press release,
McCain stated,
[n]o other type of compensation gets treated as an expense for tax
purposes, without also being treated as an expense on the company
books. This double standard is exactly the kind of inequitable corporate benefit that makes the American people irate and must be
eliminated. If companies do not want to fully disclose [sic] on their
books how much they are compensating their employees, then they
should not be able to claim a tax benefit for it.
Id. See Press Release, Senator Carl Levin of Michigan, Summary of LevinMcCain-Fitzgerald-Durbin-Dayton Ending the Double Standard for Stock
Options Act (Feb. 13, 2002) [hereinafter Levin Press Release]. This year, former SEC Chairman, Arthur Levitt, stated that one of his great regrets while
serving as Chairman was failing to require that stock options be treated as an
expense on corporate financial statements. NASP on S. 1940, supra note 138,
at para. 3.
145. Levinsohn, supra note 82, at 64. President Bush stated, “I think once
options are in the money, they ought to be calculated in the dilution, that they
ought to be dilutive in their earnings-per-share calculations.” Id.
146. McCain Press Release, supra note 139; Levin Press Release, supra note
144. For a description of the Enron scandal, see supra note 132.
147. McCain Press Release, supra note 138, at para. 3. McCain stated,
[t]he latest scandals involving the collapse of Enron highlight the
problem of misleading annual statements and financial statements…[C]urrent rules allow companies such as Enron to disclose as
little as possible. And this prevents investors, Wall Street analysts,
corporate executives and auditors from properly understanding the
bottom line of corporations.
Id. Senator Levin, stated in his press release, “The Enron fiasco has brought
to light a long-festering problem in how some U.S. corporations use stock options to avoid paying U.S. taxes while overstating earnings.” Levin Press
Release, supra note 144, at para. 1.
148. See Levin Press Release, supra note 144.
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financial statements, its reported profits would have been reduced by one-third.149 Had Enron’s profit margin been cut by
one-third, its stock price also would have deflated,150 perhaps
reflecting a more accurate price per share.
Reaction to S. 1940 from the high technology business community largely continues to be negative. Many technology organizations have taken an active stand against the bill151 and
continue to support SFAS 123.152 On the other hand, in light of
the myriad of recent accounting scandals, and in an effort to
rebuild investor confidence, major corporations voluntarily have
begun to expense stock options.153 However, many corporations
still insist that, currently, no valuation method accurately captures the cost of stock options.154
Therefore, the FASB recently agreed to amend SFAS 123 to
make it easier for companies to adopt expensing methods and to
149. Id. at para. 1.
150. See id.
151. The American Electronics Association (“AeA”) actively campaigned
against S. 1940, and rejects the idea that stock option expensing had anything
to do with the collapse of Enron. For a summary of its argument, see AeA on
S. 1940, supra note 143. The Information Technology Association of America
(“ITAA”) also rejects both S. 1940 and the Enron implications made by Levin
and McCain. Harris Miller, An Enron ‘Elixir’ Would Try to Cure What Doesn’t
Ail Us, May 1, 2002, at http://www.itaa.org/news/view/ViewPoint.cfm?ID=22.
Alan Reynolds, a senior fellow with the Cato Institute (http://www/cato.org)
also rejects both the bill and the Enron connection. See Reynolds, supra note
138.
152. AeA on S. 1940, supra note 143, at para. 5. While opposition to S. 1940
has intensified in 2002, in 1997 in a letter to the Senate Finance Committee
Chairman, the AICPA, rejected the bill. For a summary of AICPA’s objections, see Laffie, supra note 138.
153. Reuven Brenner & Donald Luskin, Another Option on Options, WALL
ST. J., Sept. 3, 2002, at A20. A small sample of companies that have chosen to
recognize stock options as an expense on their financial statements include:
The CocaCola Company, Ford Motor Co., The Gillette Company, HJ Heinz
and The Washington Post. Hughes, supra note 91, at para. 4.
154. The Wall Street Journal, in its online list of companies that have chosen to expense, printed this warning:
Calculations come from the companies’ data and use the BlackScholes formula, which links the value of an option to such variables
as the current share price, the exercise price, expected volatility in
share prices and expected dividends. This formula doesn’t give an accurate picture of the cost of stock options.
Hughes, supra note 91, at sub-heading Not Ideal.
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provide clearer, more regular disclosure. On October 4, 2002,
the FASB released an exposure draft of its proposed amendment to SFAS 123.155 The three-pronged proposed amendment
would (1) provide three transition methods for companies who
chose to adopt SFAS 123’s expensing option, (2) require clearer
disclosure of the accounting methods used, and (3) require additional disclosures in each company’s interim financial statements.156 Currently, disclosure is required only in annual financial statements.157
V. TOWARDS AN EFFECTIVE DISCLOSURE STANDARD
A. Regulatory Issue v. Political Issue
The method of disclosure of option expense on financial
statements should be determined based on standards that promote and protect accuracy and clarity, since the point of such
disclosure is to provide the investing public with sufficient information to make well-informed investment decisions.158 In the
U.S., the FASB has promulgated the GAAP since the SEC
charged it with this task in 1973.159 Congress, by threatening to
legislate around the FASB’s proposed amendments to the
GAAP, turned this regulatory issue into a political one.160 Legislators who sided with the business community, like Senator Joseph Lieberman, effectively thwarted useful accounting reform.161 In so doing, Congress exacerbated the growing option
disclosure problem. Since that time, the stock market overinflated, and legislators, through their politically-motivated decisions on accounting reform, created an environment in which
accounting disasters like Enron and WorldCom were possible.
155. Accounting for Stock Based Compensation – Transition and Disclosure,
an amendment of SFAS 123, FASB Exposure Draft, at ii, at http://www.fasb
.org/draft/ed_amend_st123.pdf [hereinafter FASB Exposure Draft]; FASB
News Release, FASB Issues Exposure Draft on Accounting for Stock Options,
Amends Transition and Disclosure Provisions, Oct. 4, 2002, at http://www.fa
sb.org/news/nr100402.shtml.
156. FASB Exposure Draft, supra note 155, at ii.
157. Id.
158. Rouse & Barton, supra note 6, at 68.
159. See Financial Accounting Standards, supra note 3.
160. Hinchman, supra note 96. See Lieberman Legislation, supra note 9, at
15.
161. See generally id.
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Ironically, in an attempt to preserve its regulatory role, the
FASB chose to abandon this important regulatory reform.
However, in so doing, it succumbed to the will of Congress, and
lost its political independence.162 By their very nature, accounting standards should be relatively static, changing only to clarify disclosure for investors. As business trends change, accounting standards also should be modified to reflect such change.
This is precisely what the FASB intended when it adopted the
FASB Exposure Draft.163 The fact that Congress was willing to
overrule the FASB to placate business interest groups shows
that the U.S. accounting body has lost its power. That the
FASB yielded to pressure from Congress is evidence that it is
not an independent body.164 In order to provide and ensure accurate disclosure for the investing public, disclosure standards
must be purely regulatory, safe from the influence of political
pressure. An argument can be made that if the U.S. adopts an
international standard, it will cede authority over its own system. However, as both the corporate community and the investing public become more global in scope, the U.S. accounting system must as well.
B. National v. International Standard
Since the business community has become increasingly
global, with foreign companies registered on U.S. exchanges
and vice versa and foreign investors investing in global markets, the need for a universal set of accounting standards has
increased. But because stock option disclosure rules vary from
country to country, it has become impossible for investors to
compare corporate balance sheets and determine profit margins. Although investors should be able to compare financial
statements on a line-by-line basis to evaluate their investment,
in reality, they are comparing apples and oranges because they
are looking at numbers derived from different accounting methods.
To alleviate this confusion, the global accounting community
should adopt one set of standards, which all countries should
agree to follow. The IASB was created by the international
162. See Reid, supra note 116.
163. See IASB Exposure Draft, supra note 12.
164. See generally id.
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community to accomplish this goal.165 Finalizing and adopting
the IASB Exposure Draft is a step in the right direction.
C. Fair Value v. Intrinsic Value & Pricing Models
As the FASB understood when it prepared the FASB Exposure Draft, Opinion No. 25’s policy of using an option’s intrinsic
value to determine its expense provides a strong incentive for
companies to issue at the money, fixed stock options, which
have no compensation cost under GAAP.166 By avoiding this
expense on their financial statements, companies give away
something of value for free.167 While an at the money grant arguably can be deemed cost-free to the issuer as of the grant
date, because it accrues value before it is exercised, it also has
value on the grant date.168
When Opinion No. 25 was drafted, it provided an important
incentive to businesses, enabling them to recruit and retain
qualified personnel, and to adopt broad-based plans under
which options are granted to all of its employees, and not just
its executives.169 However, through the successful implementation of Opinion No. 25, coupled with its inadvertent tax break, it
provides for fixed, at the money grants.170 Such options have
become a substantial percentage of corporate compensation and
now have a significant effect on the corporate balance sheet.171
Proponents of the intrinsic value method argue that determining an option’s fair value is too difficult to accomplish and
too inaccurate to be relied on,172 when in fact, neither is the case.
Both the Black-Scholes and the binomial pricing models provide
accountants with manageable formulas to ascertain the option’s
fair value.173 Moreover, while it is true that an option’s fair
value necessarily is an estimated value,174 fair value provides a
165. See IASB Mission Statement, supra note 116.
166. Ernst & Young Summary, supra note 58, at para. 20.
167. See id. at para. 13.
168. See id.
169. Johnson, supra note 14, at 148–49.
170. Rouse & Barton, supra note 6, at 68; See Ernst & Young Summary,
supra note 58, at para. 13.
171. See Ellis, supra note 4, at 412–13.
172. Rouse & Barton, supra note 6, at 69.
173. See D&T on G4+1, supra note 117, at paras. 1–2.
174. Wiedman & Goldberg, supra note 50, at 6.
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considerably more accurate valuation of an option’s cost to the
company than the intrinsic value method,175 which typically
provides no expense charge. Adoption of the intrinsic value
method discourages companies from granting performancebased options that are better tailored to an individual employee’s accomplishments,176 and significantly inflates corporate
profits on financial statements.177 In order to provide accurate
disclosure of profits and expenses on the financial statement,
intrinsic value should be discarded in determining an option’s
expense to the issuing corporation. Rather, the fair value
method should be used, employing either the Black-Scholes or
the binomial pricing models.178 The IASB wisely adopted the
fair value approach because it more accurately reflects the true
value of the compensatory stock option’s cost to the company.
While the IASB Exposure Draft provides a clearer, more
manageable valuation method, it also should pick one pricing
model to determine fair value, like the Black-Scholes pricing
model or the binomial model. Although both standards calculate an option’s fair value,179 when companies use different models, investors cannot compare financial option expense accurately because each model provides a slightly different end result. Given the primary importance of consistency and accuracy, one standard should be applied, and the choice of standard
should be taken away from companies.
VI. CONCLUSION
When the Accounting Principles Board drafted Opinion No.
25 in 1973, it was a rational accounting rule that encouraged
companies, which traditionally granted compensatory stock options only to senior executives, to share the wealth with all of
their employees,180 and provided small companies with an incentive tool to attract qualified executives whom they otherwise
could not afford to hire.181 However, as compensatory stock op-

175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.

D&T on G4+1, supra note 117, at para. 1.
See Accounting Changes, supra note 62, at 72.
See Colvin, supra note 91, at 75.
D&T on G4+1, supra note 117, at paras. 1–2.
See id.
Johnson, supra note 14, at 149–50.
Id. at 149.
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tions became widely used and had a greater impact on the profit
margins in financial statements,182 accounting standard regulators should have revised the rules so that financial statements
would have continued to reflect corporate operating expenses
accurately. When the FASB attempted to effect this need to
provide clear disclosure on corporate balance sheets, and provide transparency for investors, it was shut down by both the
business community and by the U.S. Congress.183 However, it is
clear that neither the disclosure exemption adopted by Opinion
No. 25, nor the voluntary disclosure policy set forth in SFAS
123 is sufficient to provide investors with the transparency they
require and deserve when making investment decisions.184 As it
stands, the U.S. disclosure standard, even with the FASB’s proposed amendments, deprives investors of adequate disclosure
necessary to evaluate the relative attractiveness of their investments.185
On the other hand, the IASB, not beholden to any particular
interest group, nor under the sole influence of any one political
regime, has created a new standard, which comports with the
internationally-recognized belief that stock options must be expensed in a manner that accurately reflects their true cost to
companies. 186 The IASB Exposure Draft is a better standard
than SFAS 123 because it properly treats compensatory stock
options as an expense, and because the IASB is truly independent and international. Thus, the IASB is in a better position to
promulgate unbiased accounting regulations. Once finalized,
the FASB should adopt it in lieu of SFAS 123.
Ellen J. Grossman

*

182. Ellis, supra note 4, at 412–13.
183. Lieberman Legislation, supra note 9, at 15.
184. See Rouse & Barton, supra note 6.
185. See 1992 Annual Letter, supra note 104.
186. See Survey on Accounting for Stock Options, supra note 134.
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